Last week, Sandford Living Ltd (a subsidiary of Ardstone), proposed selling a 3-bed apartment to Dublin City Council for €1.03 million as part of a social housing obligation in Dublin 6. Breaking News.
While the headline alone may stir up strong negative emotions (it certainly did for me), we need to understand the broader issue at hand, while also asking the important questions.
Should the State be buying permanent social housing units at full market cost in Ireland’s most expensive neighbourhoods?
In this article, I will try to explain why outcomes like this are now inevitable, and why direct State-led social housing delivery, funded through the €14 billion Apple tax windfall, is the only credible long-term fix.
Key Takeaways
| Issue | What the €1m apartment reveals |
|---|---|
| Social Housing Delivery | The State relies heavily on private developers and buys homes after all the risk and inflation has been factored in |
| Planning Delays | Judicial reviews silently inflate unit costs |
| Part V model | Councils negotiate prices instead of controlling costs |
| Land Prices | Speculative land values are locked in early |
| Apple Tax fund | A once-off chance to reset housing delivery |
| Core Solution | Government must build social homes directly |
Main Points from the Article
Sandford Living Ltd, is making a renewed bid to secure planning permission for a €356m apartment scheme at the corner of Sandford Rd and Milltown Rd, Dublin 6.
As part of its Part V obligations to provide 20% of its new builds for social or affordable housing, Sandford Living Ltd proposed selling 56 apartments from the 562-unit scheme to Dublin City Council.
Indicative prices included:
- €1.03m for a three-bedroom apartment
- €690,000–€820,000 for two-bedroom units
- €365,300 for a studio
The total proposed cost for the social units – €35.5 million.
Most importantly, these prices were submitted during a planning application, and not after construction. And this is exactly why I would like to elaborate on this.
Important Takeaways to Consider.
While the initial headline might sound inflamatory, I realised that it was very revealing of the current state of affairs upon reflection.
Let’s unpack.
1. The €1m figure is not that crazy when you actually talk to people in the current Irish Construction industry.
Let’s get one thing straight – Dublin 6 is one of the most expensive residential areas in Ireland. A 3-bed apartment priced at €1m sounds outrageous until you place it in context:
- Median home prices in Dublin 6 are already close to €800,000. Irish Times
- This is a 3-bedroom unit in a prime, prestigious and transport-rich location
- The price reflects replacement cost, land value, planning risk, and finance in a prime location – and not just build cost
If you know me, you will understand that I am not trying to defend the developer here, especially as its primary motive is to make as much profit as possible. However, I will admit that the developer is not claiming that the apartment is “worth” €1m in a vacuum.
They are basically signalling to us that this is the real cost of delivering social housing in elite urban postcodes under the current system.
2. Part V has quietly become one of the most expensive ways to deliver social housing.
This case exposes an unfortunate, yet growing problem with the well-intended Part V:
- Developers must provide up to 20% of units for social and affordable housing
- Councils either take units in-kind or pay an “agreed price”
- That price is typically negotiated after planning permission, when the developer holds more leverage
The Result?
- The State is often buying brand-new units at near-market rates
- In high-value areas, this can exceed €800k–€1m per unit, as seen above
- The same money could fund 2–3 social homes elsewhere!
Don’t get me wrong, I’m not trying to say mixed communities are wrong. I’m ust trying to point out that Part V can be an extremely blunt and expensive instrument when land values spiral.
3. Judicial reviews are quietly added into the price
From the original Irish Times article, it appears that this project has gone through multiple, lengthy high court judicial reviews.
These planning delays can go on for years and continue to be a glaring weakness in the Irish planning system – especially during a housing crisis.
From a developer’s perspective:
- Finance costs keep rising
- Inflation increases build costs, and they have exponentially since Covid-19
- Risk premiums also increase
- Final unit prices must absorb that uncertainty
So part of the €1m price tag is not just “greed” , it is planning system risk being passed on to the buyer, in this case is the taxpayer.
Is such an asset good value for the public?
Well, that depends on certain factors.
ARGUMENTS FOR:
- Permanent public asset in a prime location
- Helps reduce social segregation
- Close to transport, jobs, and services
- No ongoing lease or subsidy cost
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
- Very high opportunity cost
- Fewer total social homes are delivered nationwide (ie, that apartment alone could be worth 4 houses elsewhere in Ireland)
- Reinforces land-price inflation
- Locks the State into reactive purchasing instead of proactive building
In my eyes, the real issue here isn’t this one apartment. It is that the State of Ireland is trying to buy its way out of a supply crisis instead of building (directly) its way out of it.
How The Apple tax fund can Change the Equation.
As usual, I will not stop yapping about the importance of mobilising this Apple tax fund specifically to fix this housing crisis. If you’d like to see my mentions where I elaborate on the importance of this fund, please go HERE.
The €14bn Apple tax windfall is uniquely suited to housing intervention because it is a once-off, capital-focused and large enough amount that can reshape both the planning and housing system in Ireland, and help deal with structural failure.
Why the State must Build Social Housing directly.
Direct delivery allows the government to intervene where housing is cheapest, not the most expensive.
A lot could potentially change if the State (with a little political willpower) allocates the Apple Fund strictly to fix the housing crisis:
- Empower local councils to buy, restore and own easily-repairable vacant & derelict buildings
- Improve Uisce Eireann’s infrastructure by contributing to its Leakage Programme.
- Introduce schemes that activate the real sleeping giants, i,e small & medium builders.
- Improve the planning system by reducing judicial reviews and making sure that local councils are properly staffed. In fact, spending €500m on planning capacity could save billions in housing costs over a decade.
- Reduce reliance on the private rental market to stabilise house and rent prices nationwide
And the list goes on!
A €1m apartment in Dublin could become:
- €350k–€450k social housing
- €400k cost rental
- €300k shared-equity starter homes
Same city. Same standards. Different system.
A need to Revise Part V?
From what I could infer, it appears that Part V was a landmark piece of legislation when it was first introduced in the Planning and Development Act 2000. And I have nothing but gratitude for those who worked hard to put this into place.
Part V seems to have worked a lot better when:
- Land was cheaper
- Planning was faster
- Legal challenges were probably not as lengthy and
- Density was much lower in Ireland
Today, Part V, though well intended seems to:
- Transfer high costs of inflation to local councils
- Encourage negotiations that do not benefit the public or the State much
- Produce more public outrage during a serious housing crisis
Revising and protecting Part V is incredibly important in my opinion. And I believe the only way to truly go about this righ now is through public Commissioning.
Public commissioning in this case means that the Irish State decides what to build, where to build it, and pays for it upfront, instead of waiting for private developers and then buying homes back at market prices.
This is a strategy that could bring back a lot of easily restorable derelict homes back into the market if the Apple Tax fund is deployed.
Final Thought
Ardstone did not invent the housing crisis, it is merely exposing how ridiculous it has become. The €1m social apartment is not the problem, but a glaring symptom of a housing system that is unfortunately plagued by both undersupply and timid government action.
Stories like this can do real damage because they reinforce a belief that:
- The State reacts instead of plans
- Young people must adapt to this level of dysfunction and that
- Nothing may ever be structurally fixed if we over-rely on the private sector
Direct delivery would send a strong message:
The State is taking responsibility for housing outcomes, not outsourcing them.
If Ireland wants more affordable and social homes at large, the State must return to building them directly, by using this once-in-a-generation Apple Tax to fix the housing system.
